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On Income, Democracy, Political Stability, and Internal Armed
Conflicts
Abstract
Whether or not a country is likely to encounter an internal armed conflict is considered in
the literature to depend, among other things, on its extent of economic and political
development. Using a dataset covering 139 countries over the 1961-2011 period, we find
that a country’s per capita income has an unambiguously negative effect on the probability
that it encounters an armed conflict as long as it does not suffer from a severe political
instability. In contrast, countries that experience severe political instability are more likely
to encounter an armed conflict the higher is their per capita income. The policy implication
of our result is clear: safeguarding political stability during hard times is essential – and
should take precedence over enhancing democracy and economic growth – for reducing the
risk of internal armed conflicts. Our findings do not undermine the importance of
protecting democratic institution or accountability, but underscore the importance of
collaboration across opposing parties to progress while preserving the political stability.
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Introduction
In its global risk assessment reports over the last decade, the World
Economic Forum has repeatedly identified violent conflicts amongst
the most impactful risks.1 There is little doubt that armed conflicts are
indeed considered as one the most tormenting problems of the era and,
in fact, the upward trend in the occurrence of internal armed conflicts
that has been observed over the recent years is rather alarming. 2 This
article responds to the need for a better understanding of the extent to
which promoting democracy or political stability could be effective in
reducing the occurrence of internal armed conflicts in a country, as well
as examining the way this effectiveness might depend on, and interact
with, the level of economic development the country enjoys.
The potential causes of internal armed conflicts are believed to lie in
nationalistic tendencies, in grievances provoked by severe
heterogeneity in religious beliefs, ethnicity or levels of economic wellbeing, or simply in looting motivations triggered by factors such as
poverty, deprivation, social exclusion.3 The wide-spread nature of the
phenomenon has led to what is termed as the feasibility hypothesis
which is based on its self-fulfilling nature and in its more general form
maintains that rebellion and violence are likely to occur where there are
fertile grounds for them.4 This was supporting some previous evidence
which argued that the existence of fertile grounds, or favorable
conditions, in a country enables exploitation of potentials for conflicts
via facilitating the formation of and action by insurgent groups with
sufficiently strong motivations.5 Promoting economic development and
improving the quality of democratic institutions feature predominantly
amongst policy recommendations which are believed to facilitate
peaceful resolution of political conflicts. In their empirical studies,
many scholars, establish the role of per capita income in initiating
armed conflicts.6 Some other studies, which focused on the role of
regime types and democratization, find a peace promoting role for full
democracies, but a disrupting role for semi-democracies, regime
changes, and movement towards democratization.7
Repeated occurrences of conflicts in democratic regimes, for example,
India (1961, 1966, 1983, 1989, 1995, 1997, 2005, 2008) and Philippines
(1993, 1997, 1999) —and its complete absence in some rich countries
with non-democratic regimes—such as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia—are
counter examples that experts cannot regard simply as exceptions.
Therefore, a limited number of studies tried to explore the interactive
48
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role of regime type and per capita income on initiating conflicts. One
notable study finds that although the net effect of extent of democracy
is ambiguous, it is systematically related to the effect of income. 8 In
particular, the authors state that “as [per capita] income rises, not only
might democracies become safer, but the greater weight placed upon
the goal of accountability might make autocracies absolutely more
prone to violence”.9 Another study finds democracy and economic
development to play interdependent roles in affecting the risk of
conflicts; the authors conclude: “Increasing the level of economic
development reduces the risk of armed conflict only for democratic
countries, and increasing the level of democracy only for developed
countries.”10 Using evidence from three African case studies, another
study also finds that “neither democratization nor economic
development, nor a combination of them, as instruments of structural
social change, can be applied under all circumstances for conflict
resolution”.11 The existing evidence indicates a complex relationship
exists between these two factors that requires further investigation.
However, scholars have not explored thoroughly the dynamics of
political change, rather than regime type, in association with income
yet.
Therefore, building on the existing work, this article starts by
examining the empirical determination of probability of onset of
internal armed conflicts by focusing on the specific role of real per
capita income and regime type which are usually considered as proxies
respectively for the level of economic development of a country and the
extent of democracy afforded by the quality of its political institutions.12
The empirical analysis of a rich dataset confirms that, ceteris paribus,
per capita income plays a decisive role in reducing the probability of
occurrence of an armed conflict. However, by extending the analysis on
regime type and political change, this study finds that per capita
income’s effect is contingent on the extent of political stability rather
than on the level of democracy. This is the main contribution of this
study, as the previous studies have not explored explicitly the
contingent role of income per capita with dynamic political changes,
rather than static regime type, on conflicts. The results imply that
countries which suffer from a high level of political instability are more
likely to experience an internal armed conflict if their income level
exceeds the low per capita income threshold. The policy implication of
the result is clear: Promoting political stability is essential for reducing
the risk of internal armed conflicts especially in high and middleincome countries. The rest of the article is organized as follows:
49
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Empirical Methodology and Data describes the data and methodology
employed in the empirical analysis; Evidence presents and discusses
the empirical evidence; and Summary and Conclusions concludes the
article.

Empirical Methodology and Data
The empirical methodology is based on estimating the parameters of
the following regression equation
Equation 1:

′
′
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝛽 + 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜑 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑡 ∈ [1, 𝑇], 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑁],

where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 1 if there is an onset of internal armed conflict in country 𝑖
in year 𝑡 and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 0 otherwise. The model divides the explanatory
variables into two groups: those in vector 𝑥 capture the effect of income
and democracy levels under the focus of this study while vector 𝑧
includes the other relevant socio-economic characteristics as well as
several pertinent dummy variables. The country-time specific
disturbance term 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 reflects all the omissions and the model assumes
an independent distribution for the adequately specified relationship.
To populate 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 1 in the sample, this study uses the definition
provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program: “a contested
incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”13 The
focus is on explaining internal armed conflicts, data for which are
available in the form of onset and incidence.14 The latter accounts for
the existence of an active ongoing conflict in a country in a specific year
while the former records the starting of a new conflict, or when an old
and dormant conflict is retriggered after more than one year since it
was last active. Since the purpose is to explain the probability of onset
of a conflict, the dataset shall use a subset of the incidence dataset. This
is because each ongoing conflict should only retain the observation
corresponding to the starting year and exclude the rest; otherwise, one
cannot distinguish a country-year observation with an ongoing conflict
from one with no conflict.15 Table 1 displays the summary statistics
distinguishing between the onset and incidence in the full sample
which covers 139 countries over the 1961-2011 period.16
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Internal Armed Conflicts
Sample Percent of
Size
occurrence
in the
Sample
Onset of a Conflict (only newly
5515
4.15
started; ongoing conflicts
excluded)
Incidence of a Conflict (both
6224
15.07
newly started and ongoing
conflicts)
For explanatory variables in vector 𝑥, this study uses a country’s real
income-per-head and its political position within a well-established
measure of regime authority spectrum. The common practice is to use
the real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in constant United
States currency prices and the Polity Score, which respectively denote
by 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 and 𝑅𝑇.17 The rest of the explanatory variables, which appear
in vector 𝑧, are selected on the basis of the statistical significance of
their explanatory role in the sensitivity analysis carried out in a study,
which examined 88 most commonly used variables in the literature.18
These consists of Peace Duration, Ethnic Heterogeneity, Rough
Terrain, Population, and GDP Growth. The model also adds the average
annual growth rate of temperature to represent the climatic factor—of
which some more recent studies have explained their relevance—as
well as a dummy variable for each of the following: Oil exporter
countries; countries with a conflict in their neighboring nations;
countries located in a specific region of the world; years of political
disruptions following the ending of the Cold War; and, the year fixed
effect.19 These variables will always feature as the fixed set of control
variables in all regression equations which this study examines in the
below. This study uses lagged form for all time-dependent explanatory
variables. This is because it is likely to takes time for the change in
these variables to trigger a conflict and, more importantly, the
existence of reverse causality between the dependent and explanatory
variables implies that their current values are jointly determined. Given
the purpose, using lags is an adequate method of avoiding the
simultaneity bias problem.20
Evidence
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Although the full dataset covers 139 countries over the 1961-2011
period, onset only occurs in 229 observations—see Table 1. It is also
worth noting at the outset that, as one would expect, the distribution of
onset cases is uneven across countries and vary with countries’ extent
of economic and political status. As a preliminary indication of this,
Figure 1 divides countries into three different income levels and three
regime types and find a non-negligible variation in the rate of conflict
across these groups. To further highlight the relevance of income and
democracy levels, Figures 2 and 3 show how 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 and 𝑅𝑇, averaged
across all the countries within the sample, compare with patterns of
onset and incidence of conflicts. Clearly, given the nature of
aggregation, these figures are merely illustrative. Nevertheless, they
provide some preliminary indication of how 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 , 𝑅𝑇 and conflicts
have, on average, evolved over time; even at this level of aggregation
the existence of some mild counter cyclical pattern is evident which
encourages the use of more detailed regression analysis.
Figure 1. Rate of conflict by regime type and income level

This figure measures rate of conflict as the ratio of number
of observations involving a conflict to the total number of
observations in the sample. The income thresholds are
$875 and $10725, based on the World Bank constant $ in
2005.
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Figure 2. Per capita GDP and conflict pattern

Figure 3. Polity score and conflict pattern

Encouraged by the above preliminary evidence, this study starts the
regression analysis of Equation 1 which, given the binary form of the
dependent variable, is expressed as
Equation 2:

′
′
′
′
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 1|(𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
, 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1
)) = 𝐹(𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝛽 + 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1
𝜑)+

𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ,
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to reflect the assumption that its right-hand-side determines the
conditional probability of an onset—where 𝐹(∙) is the underlying
distribution function which this study assume to determine the
probability of occurrence of the event subject to the independently
distributed random disturbance term, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 . The analysis uses the logit
approach to estimate different versions of Equation 2. To begin, this
′
study specifies 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝛽 as
′
2
Equation 3: 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝛽 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃2 𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
+ [𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑝𝑐
2
𝛾2 𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
]𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
,

which this study postulates based on two main assumptions derived
from the discussions in the literature, namely it is:
•
•

Possible that the impact of 𝑅𝑇 is nonlinear and heightens as
𝑅𝑇 approaches autocracy or democracy extremes; and
Likely that the effects of 𝑅𝑇 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 are contingent on each
other, capturing which requires including their interactions.

Clearly, the sign and statistical significance of the parameter estimates
determine if data can support this generalization. In particular:
•

If it is true that, regardless of level of income, more
democratic regimes are less likely to experience internal
armed conflicts, one would expect to find estimates of
2
[𝜃1 𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃2 𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
] to reduce (or even become negative) as
𝑅𝑇 increases; and

•

If it is believed that there is a smaller chance of occurrence of
internal armed conflicts in richer countries regardless of
their regime type, one would expect to find estimates of
2
[𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2 𝑅𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
] to be negative for all values of 𝑅𝑇
so that increasing 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 lowers the probability of conflict. In
addition, 𝜃2 = 𝛾2 = 0 implies that there is no nonlinearity in
the way 𝑅𝑇 deters conflicts while 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0 ensures that the
impacts of 𝑅𝑇 and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 are not contingent on each other.

Table 2 illustrates the estimated values of 𝜃𝑗 and 𝛾𝑗 . As column (I)
shows, except the intercept coefficient 𝜃0 , no coefficient estimates are
′
statistically significant when the model specifies 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝛽 as in Equation
54
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2022

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 15, No. 2

2. The rest of the columns report coefficient estimates corresponding to
the restricted versions of Equation 2 and show that on the whole data
seem to favor excluding both nonlinearity in the effect of 𝑅𝑇 and
interactions between 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 and 𝑅𝑇. This is because the specification in
column (V) which correspond to imposing restrictions 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 𝜃2 = 0
statistically outperform the rest. However, while the effect of 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 ,
captured by 𝛾0, has the expected sign indicating that the probability of
onset of a conflict falls as per capita income rises, the positive sign of
coefficient of 𝑅𝑇, 𝜃1 , is counterintuitive since it implies that, ceteris
paribus, more democratic regimes are more likely to experience an
internal armed conflict.
The data used for 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 and 𝑅𝑇 in the above regression analysis are
based on continuous measures of income and regime type. There is,
however, a view in the literature that dichotomized measures of these
variables could better capture their role in this context. As an
alternative for 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 , a dummy variable can be constructed to indicate
if 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑐 belongs to the per capita income ranges as advocated by the
World Bank, in other words 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑐 ≤ $875, $875 < 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑐 ≤ $10725,
and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑐 > $10725 for low, middle and high per capita income levels,
respectively.21 The Polity Score, 𝑅𝑇, also can be replaced by a dummy
which indicates whether 𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 is within a range that the corresponding
regime could be considered democratic or non-democratic. It is
common to associate democracy with the score range [6, 10] while
scores within [-10, 5] and -77 and -88 are considered non-democratic.
The findings suggest that using these dichotomized versions of per
capita income level and regime type, instead of 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑐 and 𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 , did not
improve upon the results reported in Table 2. In addition, changing the
regime type classification by using the trio of democracy (>+5 policy
score), anocracy (between ±5 inclusive), and autocracy (<−5)—based
on the recommendation of Policy score developers—did not alter the
results either (therefore do not report the corresponding results).22
Table 2. Logit Estimates of Coefficients of Equation 3
Coeffici
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
ents
-11.59*** -11.60*** -11.70***
𝜃0
12.05***
-0.0661
-0.159
-0.158
-0.175*
𝛾0
0.0223
0.0250
0.0294*
0.0510
𝜃1
0.0080
0
𝜃2

(V)
11.69***
-0.175*
0.0278*
0
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6
𝛾1
𝛾2

R2
Log-L
AIC
BIC

0.0013
6
0.0021
3
0.2761
602.08
1336
1759

0.00745* 0.00742*
*

*

0.00064

0

0

0.2756
602.494
1335
1751

0

0

0.00333
0

0.2756
-602.49

0.2726
-605.03

0.2725
-605.08

1333
1743

1338
1748

1336
1739

0

The sample size in all regressions is 4463, consisting of an unbalanced
combination of annual observations on 139 countries over the period
1961-2011. All regressions include the same control variables as
explained above. The coefficient estimates report log-odds. ***,’ **and
*denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively,
based on t-ratios using standard errors clustered at the country level to
reduce the bias in standard errors.23 R2 and Log-L are the pseudo
goodness of fit and log-likelihood values, respectively. AIC and BIC are
Akaike and Schwarz information criteria (based on the log-likelihood),
respectively.
The counter intuitive result regarding the effect of regime type is rather
alarming and the fact that the model also fails to find any link between
its role and that of per capita income is somewhat unsatisfactory. The
political environment of a country is bound to play a decisive role in
determining the risk of onset of an internal armed conflict, be it directly
or via influencing the impact of other variables, in particular per capita
income. As the above estimates show the Polity score is clearly not
capturing this. One possibility is that it is the extent of political
stability, rather than level of democracy, that constitutes the
appropriate explanatory variable in this context. As an earlier study
argues,24 more democratic regimes are not necessarily more efficient in
maintaining peace; this is to some extent evident in Figure 1. Also, the
breakdown of an unstable political regime is accompanied often by
violence and conflict. It is therefore important to distinguish between
the relevance of political regime type and political regime stability in
the context of what determines the onset of an internal armed conflict.
As observed by Collier and Rohner “both Stalin and Saddam Hussein
were able to maintain peace through intense repression despite
56
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manifest reasons for popular grievance. In both societies, more
democratic successor governments have faced more violence because
accountability to the law has limited what security services have the
permission to do.” 25 Therefore, building on the existing work—now
examine the role of political instability which quantify using the extent
of change in a country’s Polity score.26 More specifically, distinguish
between major and minor instability cases which define as follows:
𝑀𝑎𝑗

Major Political Instability: A dummy variable, denoted by 𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ,
which is set to unity if country 𝑖 has
experienced a three units or larger
change in its Polity score in at least one
of the last three years, 𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 − 2 or 𝑡 −
𝑀𝑎𝑗

3. Otherwise, 𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡

= 0.

𝑀𝑖𝑛
Minor Political Instability: A dummy variable, denoted by 𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
,

which is set to unity if country 𝑖 has
experienced a less than 3 unit change in
its Polity Score in at least one of the last
three years 𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 − 2 or 𝑡 − 3.
𝑀𝑖𝑛
Otherwise, 𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
= 0.
Table 3 provides a comparison between occurrences of major and
minor instability in the sample and shows that, while they are observed
in all regime types, major instability is relatively more prevalent in
general, and much more frequent in anocracies which experience the
highest instability amongst the three established regime types—
although, as expected, interregnum and transition regimes show the
highest rate of major instability.
Table 3. Instability in different regime types
Major Instability
Minor Instability
Stable
𝑀𝑎𝑗

𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
=0
Autocracy
Anocracy
Democracy
Interregnum
& Transition

Unsta
ble
𝑀𝑎𝑗
𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡

2057
989
2345

=1
209
302
212

60

122

Unstabl
e

Instabi
lity
Rate

Stable

9.22
23.39
8.29

2087
1174
2368

179
117
189

7.89
9.06
7.39

67.03

176

6

3.29

𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡

=0

𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡

=0

Instabi
lity
Rate
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Total
5,451
845
5805
491
The Instability Rate is defined as the ratio of number of
Stable observations to Stable and Unstable observations
(multiplied by 100).
This study examines the explanatory role of political instability by
estimating two versions of Equation 2 where the next step is now to
′
replace 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝛽 with the following
Equation 4:

𝑝𝑐
𝑝𝑐
𝑘
𝑘
′
𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝛽 = 𝛿𝑘 + 𝜆𝑘 𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜂𝑘 𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾𝑘 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
,

for 𝑘 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 and 𝑘 = 𝑀𝑎𝑗. Table 4 illustrates the estimated values of
parameters of Equation 4 for both cases, confirming that the direct
effect of 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 , captured by 𝛾𝑘 , is negative and statistically significant
at 5 percent critical value, regardless of the nature of political stability.
However, while 𝜆𝑀𝑖𝑛 = 𝜂𝑀𝑖𝑛 = 0 cannot be rejected and therefore find
no support for any significant role when considering minor political
instability, major political instability does play an effective role: The
estimate of 𝜂𝑀𝑎𝑗 is positive and statistically significant at 5 percent
critical value. In addition, its estimated value is sufficiently large to
make (𝛾𝑀𝑎𝑗 + 𝜂𝑀𝑎𝑗 )—which captures the the total effect of 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 —
positive, hence implying that richer countries which experience major
𝑀𝑎𝑗

instability, for which 𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡

= 1, are more likely to encounter an

internal conflict. Finally, the average marginal effect of major
𝑀𝑎𝑗

instability based on estimates of coefficient of 𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 , (𝜆𝑀𝑎𝑗 +
𝑝𝑐
𝑝𝑐
𝜂𝑀𝑎𝑗 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
), evaluated at different levels of 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
, is plotted in

Figure 4 which shows that the effect of political instability is
statistically insignificant in low income countries—presumably because
they cannot afford an uprising by starting an armed conflict—but starts
to become significant once a country’s per capita income exceeds the
low-income threshold.
Table 4. Logit Estimates of Coefficients of Equation 4
Regressors

𝑘 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛

𝑘 = 𝑀𝑎𝑗

𝛿𝑘
𝜆𝑘
𝜂𝑘
𝛾𝑘
R2
L

-9.961***
1.504
-0.222
-0.196**

-9.259***
-1.894*
0.349**
-0.274**

0.2584
-616.78

0.2632
-612.81
58
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AIC
1361
1353
BIC
1771
1763
The sample size in both regressions is 4463. See notes
to Table 2.
Figure 4. AMEs of 𝑃𝐼𝑀𝑎𝑗 with 90 Percent Confidence Intervals

The evidence, based on using major stability, agrees with the
implications of the literature on the role of economic and political
development in determining the probability of an internal armed
conflict. Its usefulness lies in narrowing down the issue for policy
considerations as it stresses prioritizing political stability ahead of
enhancing democracy and economic growth.
Given policy the relevance of the results reported for 𝑘 = 𝑀𝑎𝑗 in Table
4, the analyses carried out the following to ensure their robustness:
•

Using the incident sample instead of the onset sample,
replacing logit with the probit estimation method, using the
approach recommended by Pregibon to eliminate
observations with high leverage from the sample, or applying
the method advocated by Hosmer and colleagues to omit
observations with large residuals (based on Pearson and
Deviance Residuals), did not lead to any significant changes
in the results.27

•

Re-estimated the equation after replacing the 𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡

𝑀𝑎𝑗

dummy

described above with a continuous measure which
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constructed using a decay function of the number of years
since the last indication of major regime instability. The
estimated values of the parameters were 𝜆𝑀𝑎𝑗 = −2.384,

•

𝜂𝑀𝑎𝑗 = 0.530 and 𝛾𝑀𝑎𝑗 = −0.296 which were statistically
significant at 5 percent to 10 percent range, lending further
support to the results reported in Table 4.
Finally, replacing per capita GDP with Night Time Lights
data, on the grounds that the latter provide an objective
proxy for economic activity and overcome the poor quality of
GDP data for some of the regions, did not lead to any
encouraging results.28 However, the Night Time Lights data
are only available from 1993 and the shortening of the
sample is a crucial factor since the period only covers the
post-Cold War era.

Summary and Conclusions
The literature considers the extent of economic and political
development, among other things, as one of the key predictors of onset
of internal armed conflicts. Several studies have examined empirically
this causal relationship using the real per capita income and an index of
level of democracy as proxies for the extent of economic and political
development. Their results, however, do not lead to an unambiguous
conclusion on the way these factors might influence the occurrence of
internal armed conflicts in a country. The need for further scrutinizing
the underlying empirical relationship has motivated this article.
Using a cross-section time-series dataset that covers 139 countries,
spans from 1961 through 2011, and controls for other influential socioeconomic, geographic and climate factors which other studies have
identified as relevant, this article has used appropriate regression
analysis to examine the combined impacts of level of democracy and
economic development on the probability of onset of armed conflicts.
Following common practice, this study approximated the using
countries’ Polity score and real per capita GDP, and obtained the
corresponding data on the onset of conflict from the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program. The empirical investigation, based on estimating several
differently specified regression equations which are formulated based
on predictions found in the existing literature, does not reveal a clear
explanatory role for a country’s level of democracy but suggests that per
capita income has an unambiguously negative effect on the probability
that it encounters an armed conflict if the country does not suffer from
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a severe political instability. In contrast, countries that experience
severe political instability are more likely to encounter an armed
conflict the higher is their per capita income. This result is statistically
robust, to the extent that it survives when subjected to various
econometric checks, and constitutes a new contribution to the
literature as it complements the existing results by placing a stronger
emphasis on the role of promoting political stability, rather than merely
sponsoring democracy, as means of maintaining peace.
The United States government and its allies have long been involved in
operations to help fragile states with a view to prevent conflict and
promote stability. Bensahel et al. identify several major shortcomings
in preparation and execution of United States-led multinational
stabilizing interventions which are bound to undermine their
effectiveness, and go on to recommend ways of improving United
States capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations.29 Along
the same lines, the first recommendation of Africa Report 9 states that
“Policy makers need to invest more to identify entry points for
mitigating political instability and capitalize on opportunities for
stability, development and peace.”30 The results provide timely
evidence that could complement these recommendations, which should
be considered in revising strategies to prevent conflict and promote
stability, and in prioritizing conflict-prevention/mitigation
interventions, when tackling the identified conflicts in “areas of
geographic focus.”31
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